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Abstract
Can growth in India be simultaneously made equitable and environmentally sustainable? The recent pattern of high growth in India has
been inequitable even as serious questions have been raised about its
ecological sustainability. In contrast to the current growth trajectory,
this paper argues that an alternative growth trajectory can be developed which answers the question in the affirmative. We propose
an Energy Policy with Equity (EPE), which fundamentally changes
the energy mix of the Indian economy towards greener forms of energy as well as guarantees universal access to energy thus generated
to the entire population, a feat that almost all the governments since
independence have dreamt of but failed to deliver. This policy also
fundamentally changes the energy mix of the Indian economy towards
greener forms of energy as well as guarantees universal access to energy
thus generated to the entire population.
This can be done by taxing carbon to control CO2 emissions. A part
of the revenue thus generated can be used for a systemic overhaul of
the energy mix, which to a large extent addresses the pressing problem
of environmental degradation. And the other part can be used for an
in-kind transfer of free electricity to the population who contribute less
carbon than the economy average and issue universal travel passes to
compensate for the rise in transport costs and encourage the use of
public transport.
The methodology employed in this paper is an Input-Output analysis which involves two steps: calculating the carbon content (IO data)
and its impact on the household budget (NSS). The level of carbon
tax required for this policy to come into effect is USD 60.4 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. On the one hand, a portion of these taxes
mobilised is allocated for the improvement in energy efficiency and expansion of renewable energy. On the other, the free entitlement of fuel
and electricity from these taxes for a household comes out to be 2268
kWh per annum or 189 kWh per month, which is 412 kWh per year
multiplied by the average size of the household (i.e. 5.5). Universal
travel passes with pre-loaded balance amount of USD 17.9 can be used
on any mode of public transport. While the energy mix of the growth
process changes in favour of clean sources through investment in green
energy as well as controlling demand for fossil fuels through a carbon
tax/cap, distribution of the tax revenue in the form of universal access
to energy makes the process egalitarian.
Keywords: carbon tax, right to energy, energy policy, inequality,
pollution, India.
JEL Classification: Q52, Q58
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Introduction

Can growth in India be simultaneously made equitable and environmentally
sustainable? The recent pattern of high growth in India has been inequitous
even as serious questions have been raised about its ecological sustainability. In contrast to the current growth trajectory, this paper argues that an
alternative growth trajectory can be developed which answers the question
in the affirmative.
One of the central questions discussed in the context of high growth in
India has been its exclusive reach to a select section of the population. In
fact, the then Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, had to argue for an
‘inclusive’ growth as a response to this challenge. That this high growth has
also not paid adequate attention to the environment is also well-known. To
give a sense of the enviromental degradation that this growth process has
contributed to, the greenhouse gas emissions during the relatively low growth
phase of the 1990s on an average were 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent,
which increased to 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent during the 2000s.
By 2010, India’s total greenhouse gas emissions were almost double than the
levels in 1990.1 It is imperative for us, therefore, to address the issues of
inequality and environmental sustainability arising out of the Indian growth
process. This paper attempts to do that. We propose an Energy Policy with
Equity (EPE), which fundamentally changes the energy mix of the Indian
economy towards greener forms of energy as well as guarantees universal
access to energy thus generated to the entire population.
The broad contours of the policy are as follows. Any green energy policy
needs to alter India’s dependence on fossil fuels, which requires a systemic
overhaul of its energy mix. Taking cue from an earlier paper by two of the
authors (Pollin and Chakraborty [2015]), the energy mix can be changed
through investments in clean renewable energy and energy efficiency that
would span across all four major areas of energy usage in India i.e., residences, commercial buildings, transportation systems and industrial production.
While the energy mix of the production process can be changed by implementing supply side policies (discussed in details below), the consumption
side of it can be partly addressed by these supply side policies and partly by
implementing a system of carbon tax. We propose that a part of the carbon
revenue thus generated can be used for an in-kind transfer of free energy to
the population who contribute less carbon than the economy average (based
1
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on the concept of climate injustice quotient (CIQ)). We call this the Right
to Energy programme along similar lines as food, health or educational programmes. We question here the International Energy Agency’s viewpoint
that policy makers in the developing countries need to realize that energy is
a commodity, and not an entitlement (International Energy Agency [2015]).
The other part of the carbon revenue can be used for a systemic overhaul of
the energy mix, which addresses the problem of environmental degradation
and limited access to energy.
Environmentally sustainable growth has come on the agenda of the global
North but the same cannot be said about the global South. In the South,
these are usually presumed to be the ’problems of the North’. The number
of articles, ideas, policy recommendations on this issue of environmental
degradation that are coming from the respective part of the world captures
the sense of this difference. This notion of a dichotomy of a pressing problem
such as the environment is, however, not only counterproductive but also
irresponsible towards our future in many ways.
First, even in the immediate sense, as a result of the global warming, the
countries which are likely to be affected most will be the tropical countries
because of their low altitudes and already high temperatures (Mendelsohn
et al. [2006], Martin [2015]). Martin [2015] argues, based on a report by a
U.K.-based risk analysis firm Maplecroft, that out of the top 32 countries
at “extreme risk” from climate change, the top 10 are all tropical countries.
According to a recent study(Im et al. [2017]), the densely populated agrarian
regions of the Ganges and Indus river basins are identified as the most
intense hazard affected areas from intense heat waves, expected during the
end of the 21st century, from global warming. This study also suggests
that climate change presents a serious threat to these areas of South Asia
due to an unprecedented combination of severe natural hazard and acute
vulnerability. So, it is in their own interest to take this problem seriously
and contribute towards solving it. Only with a collective effort from the
North and the South can this serious problem of climate change be stalled.
Second, while it is true that the stock of carbon has been contributed to
mostly by the first world countries due to their industrial past based on fossil
fuel energy, the emerging market economies are contributing a decent share
to the flows (in absolute terms and not per capita terms). Moreover, when
it comes to the environment, the argument simply cannot be that ‘since
you have polluted earlier, we have a right to do so today’ or that by asking
for a blueprint of gradually declining emissions targets, the ladder is being
kicked away for the emerging market economies. In this paper, we will show
that there is no either/or choice between growth and sustainability. In fact,
2

our argument will be that green growth policy can be planned in a manner
by which it delivers equitable and sustainable growth and, in the process,
achieve three objectives of economic growth, sustainability and equity.
Third, hiding behind low per capita emissions even as the absolute emissions are high is also a bit problematic because what matters for the world is
not the incremental contribution of an individual to total emissions but what
we, as a humankind, are contributing to the environment. Once the temperatures rise globally, it will not choose its victims based on their individual
contribution to the problem. In fact owing to the poor socio-economic conditions, high population density along coastlines, job dependence on agriculture and other allied activities in the South, the casualties of environmental
degradation (arising out of rising water levels, cyclones and other devastating natural events) are going to be significantly more than the North.
Fourth, what is the point of treading the same path that the North
did to reach where they have today only to realise at that point that the
time to address the environment issues has now come on the agenda? That
‘now’ might be too late to tackle this problem as is evident from the current
signs of emissions (more on which later). If due to international pressures,
political and economic, rapid technological advancements take place in the
North, the South should surely not wait till it has followed the same path
that the North has to reach a stage of development that it is in today. In
fact given the abundance of renewable natural resources in the tropics, the
South should invest in developing indigenous alternative technologies based
on utilizing them, which can give it an advantage in this competitive world of
technological advancement. Furthermore, the fact that it controls the supply
of these resources purely because of its geographical location in the world
should further buttress the point to go for such a technological progress.
The South should not become the victim again of a colonial pattern of trade
of resources extracted from the South towards the North because of latter’s
exclusive rights over sustainable technology. The South should preempt that
and it can only do so if it plans ahead.
Taking account of the issues raised above, this paper presents an energy
proposal for India, which makes its growth process environmentally sustainable and at the same time inclusive by its very design. To do so, we propose
that carbon be taxed so as to disincentivise its usage and the revenue generated through it be partly used to provide complete access to electricity
across the country and partly to invest in a clean green energy program, so
as to change the underlying energy mix of the country.
The paper is divided in six sections. The second section presents a brief
overview of the literature. The third section discusses in detail our proposal
3

of combining ecology and equity into a comprehensive energy policy in India.
Data and methodology used for this study are discussed in the fourth section.
The fifth section presents the results of our study and the final section
concludes the paper.

2

Background

2.1

Inequality in Income and Limited Access to Energy

It is a well-accepted fact that there has been a significant rise in the average
rate of growth of the Indian economy since the 1980s. However, its impact on
poverty is debatable, at least about its extent (Sen and Himanshu [2004a,b],
Deaton [2008], Sundaram and Tendulkar [2003]) with some questioning the
claim of reduction itself (Patnaik [2007]). On one issue, however, there is
a consensus that the inequality has increased significantly since the 1990s
(Jayadev et al. [2007], Anand and Thampi [2016]). Since there is no data
collected on the income of the households in India, most of the studies
on inequality have based their estimates on the inequality in consumption,
which by its very nature underestimates inequality.2 Studies on wealth
inequality show that it has increased significantly since the economic reforms
(Subramanian and Jayaraj [2006], Jayadev et al. [2007]). A recent study
shows that the share in total wealth of the top 1% has increased from 16.9%
in 1991 to 27.6% in 2012 (Anand and Thampi [2016]).
Given the increase in consumption, and thereby, income and wealth inequalities, it can be inferred that there would have been a rise in inequality
of carbon emissions along similar lines since the lifestyle choices of the upwardly mobile increases emissions per unit of expenditure. Some earlier
studies have shown that the top 10% of the urban population account for
emissions of 3416 kg per capita per annum, while the bottom 10% of the
rural population account for only 141 kg per capita per annum (Parikh
and Gokarn [1993]). More recent studies show the overall per capita emissions in India are low with the high emissions of the rich ‘hiding behind the
poor’, whose emissions are quite low (Ananthapadmanabhan et al. [2007]).
A more nuanced class based analysis shows the inequality of emissions of
the urban/rural elite versus the working people of the country (Michael and
Vakulabharanam [2016]). Ananthapadmanabhan et al. [2007] end their paper by hinting at a carbon tax system in India, which not only addresses
2
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the devastating environmental impact of the lifestyle of the elite but also
addresses inequality in emissions.
It is not surprising that the inequality is not just seen in income and
wealth but is reflected in other indices as well, one of the most interesting
ones relevant for this paper being the unequal access to electricity and other
energy sources in the country. As of 2014, more than 20.0% of India’s
population does not have access to electricity, while a substantial number of
areas that are served with electricity still experience daily blackouts. In July
2012, India experienced the largest power outage ever recorded, affecting
roughly 700 million people.

2.2

Enhancing Renewable Energy and Improving Energy Efficiency: A Supply Side Response

1. With vast potentials for generation of renewable energy, renewable
energy needs to be made an integral part of India’s development plans
for future energy needs. It will help the economy to achieve energy
self sufficiency, which became a priority in the policy circles since the
oil shocks of the 1970s. It will also help in facilitating energy access to
those sections of population who do not have any access to electricity
and, thereby, lack access to any basic infrastructural facilities like clean
drinking water, cooking fuels and sanitation facilities. Therefore, the
eleventh five year plan formulated by the Planning Commission also
argues for a case where renewable energy is expected to supplement the
conventional energy sources and meet basic energy needs and provide
accessibility to energy, especially in the rural and remote areas of India
(Planning Commission [2008]).
2. One of the imperative problems that affected the expansion of renewable energy in the past had been the relatively expensive costs of
renewable energy compared to those of the fossil fuels based energy.
However, with technological advancement in the field of renewable
energy, the recent cost trajectory has been very favorable to it and
some recent studies show that renewable energy from most sources
are already at cost parity with non-renewable sources. In India, wind,
hydropower, biomass power and solar PV are all able to compete with
fossil fuel power generation, with increasingly renewable energy becoming the least-cost generation option (IRENA [2017]). As argued in
this paper, an affirmative action of carbon tax or a carbon cap policy,
which captures the environmental costs of carbon emissions, will fur-
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ther help to raise the prices of emissions-generating energy sources and
make the costs of renewable energy sources more favorable relative to
the fossil fuels.
3. Technological improvements in the renewable energy sector, especially
in the fields of solar, wind, geothermal, small scale hydro and clean
bioenergy, which constitutes of what we term the clean renewable energy sources have the huge potential of not only providing an energy
infrastructure in these remote areas at a cheaper cost, but also bring
a substantial improvement in the lives of these common people and a
sense of entitlement through joint ownership of the projects in these
backward communities. The increased investments in a clean green
energy will help in generating jobs, ensuring decent livelihoods for the
populace, and help drive India’s future economic growth towards a
more egalitarian path (Pollin and Chakraborty [2015]).
4. Significantly raising the bars of energy efficiency in all three major
areas of energy usage -i.e. buildings (commercial as well as residential), industry and transportation - offer major opportunities for the
Indian economy. Hence, along with investments in the clean renewable
energy programme, an equal emphasis needs to be put on improving
energy efficiency, which needs to be one of the cornerstones of our
clean energy investment programme. Although there is a possibility
of a ‘rebound effect’, whereby improved standards of energy efficiency
encourage consumers to expand their energy-using activities, Pollin
[2015] and Pollin et al. [2015] have argued elsewhere that the most
effective way to limit these rebound effects is to combine efficiency investments with complementary measures to greatly expand the supply
of clean renewables and to raise the prices of fossil fuel based energy
sources through either a carbon tax or a carbon cap.
5. As noted earlier in Pollin and Chakraborty [2015], the Indian economy
is operating at a high level of inefficiency measured in terms of energy
intensity, which is the ratio of the amount of energy used to the value of
GDP. Table 5 of Pollin and Chakraborty [2015] shows that as of 2012
India’s energy intensity ratio stands at 17.0 Q-BTUs per 1 trillion
USD, which is almost 140% above the global average of 7.1. Although
the Indian economy has established the Bureau of Energy Efficiency
(BEE), which periodically mandates regulatory standards, and formulates promotional schemes to improve energy efficiency, the abovementioned figure shows that India’s energy infrastructure presently
6

operates at a very low efficiency level, suggesting, in turn, that especially large benefits could be generated through further expansion of
energy efficiency programme (as described later in the study).
6. However, for these expansions of clean renewable energy capacity and
improved standards of energy efficiency to be achieved, there needs
to be substantial investment in the green energy programme. As proposed in Pollin and Chakraborty [2015], we estimate that an additional
1.5 percent of GDP above the current trend of approximately around
0.6 percent of GDP, needs to be invested over a 20 year period to
achieve the right energy mix. It means this will bring the total clean
energy investments to about 2.0% of GDP for a period of around 20
years.

2.3

Carbon Tax: A Demand Side Response

A carbon tax system which addresses climate change has been studied extensively in the context of the developed countries. Emissions3 can be controlled
from the demand side either directly through quantity restrictions (carbon
cap) or indirectly through a carbon tax.
But given the fact that taxes increase prices and, hence, adversely affect
the purchasing power of the people, a legitimate question to be asked is
if there are better alternatives to a carbon tax or at least whether they
can implemented alongside other alternatives available. This paper argues
that a just system of carbon tax can be implemented only if it is combined
with other alternatives otherwise it will end up being extremely regressive
by worsening the livelihood of the poor in India. We have discussed the
literature on these alternatives above, so, we focus here on carbon tax.
Carbon tax system is usually quite regressive (tax burden as a share of
income) in nature. This is because of inequalities in income and higher consumption propensities of the poor (owing to their low income) even though
the per capita footprints of the poor are significantly lower than those of the
rich. Hence, the more unequal the society, the more regressive the burden
is likely to be.4 Is there a way to make this cost-effective carbon tax system
equitable? There are two ways in which this regressive nature of this system
can be addressed: ‘tax/cap and spend’, which indirectly compensates the
3

The term emissions used here is from energy alone (in particular fossil fuel energy)
and not emissions from non-energy sources.
4
In certain cases, carbon tax might not be regressive if the consumption bundle of the
poor is such that high carbon emitting commodities form a smaller share of their total
budget. In the Indian case, as shown later, the tax system is indeed regressive.
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aggrieved parties, or ‘tax/cap and distribute’, which directly compensates
those affected by it.
Some of the earlier studies like Metcalf [1999], whose methodology has
been used and cited extensively throughout this literature, argues for a ‘tax
and distribute’ policy where distribution done through tax rebates on ‘distortionary’ payroll and personal income taxes nullifies the initial burden.
It may even have positive macroeconomic effects through an increase in
investment (corporate tax rebates) or consumption (payroll tax rebates)
(Jorgenson et al. [2015], Williams et al. [2014]).
There are others who have argued for a ‘cap/tax and dividend’ policy
of an equal distribution of the tax revenue generated among the people of
the country, thereby, directly countering the regressivity of the carbon tax
(Boyce and Riddle [2007, 2011], Horowitz et al. [2017], Fremstad and Paul
[2017]). Such a policy is inherently progressive because while the tax burden
is based on one’s own expenditure, the dividend is based on everybody’s
expenditure. The more unequal the income, the more progressive this policy
will be.
While there are many studies dealing with the tax and distributional
impacts of such a policy in the North, there is a lack of research on this
question within the South, one of the primary reasons of which, referred to
in the introduction, is the difference in policy priorities. There are, however,
a few exceptions.
There is a variation in the findings on whether carbon taxes are in themselves necessarily regressive in the context of the developing countries. While
some have found it not to be so given the composition of demand of the absolute poor in the country (Brenner et al. [2007] for China, Younger [1996] and
Younger et al. [1999] for Ghana and Madagascar), others have found it to
be regressive (Shah and Larsen [1992] for Pakistan, Tarr and Jensen [2002]
for Iran). In either case, the effect of a dividend policy is unequivocally
progressive for the same reasons as in the case of the North.

2.4

Our contribution: Energy Policy with Equity

We call our proposal the Energy Policy with Equity (EPE).
The first concern is about ecology. How does India reduce the carbon
emissions relative to current levels in order to help the world achieve its
target reduction of total greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions by 80% compared to 1990s as of 2050? To target the emissions, we need to address both
its supply and demand sides. The supply side entails an active investment
programme which changes the energy mix of an economy while the demand
8

side can be taken care of either by a carbon tax or a carbon cap. The reason
why we stress both is that addressing it only from the demand side might
put severe hardship on the poor people as well as put a brake on growth in
an economy, neither of which is desirable. On the other hand, reduction of
emissions through an exclusive focus on the supply side depends critically
on the pace of the growth rate (exogenously given by demand side) and how
fast the energy mix changes. A fast growing economy, such as India, cannot
afford to focus on just one side of the problem.
Second is about equity. Carbon taxes/cap negatively affects the real
income of the people even as the effects across different deciles of the households can be regressive or progressive depending on the manner in which
carbon footprint per dollar declines or increases respectively with income.
As discussed above, it can be compensated for by distributing equally the
tax revenue generated as dividend across the population. We propose an
alternative to this policy because of the severe limitations of cash transfer
in the context of a developing country. We propose an in-kind transfer of
free energy to the population who contributes less carbon than the economy
average (based on the concept of climate injustice quotient (CIQ)). We call
this the Right to Energy programme along similar lines as food, health or
educational programmes. We believe that this policy has the potential of
bringing electricity to every household in India irrespective of their income
levels.

3

A Detailed Discussion on Energy Policy with
Equity

3.1
3.1.1

Ecology: Caring for the Environment
Controlling Emissions from the Supply Side

The trajectory of green growth is much like planning the pattern of growth
and development in any economy. So, to lay down the basic point about
the right energy mix and its repercussions on growth, let us start with the
proposition that there are two forms of energy (E) programs available: fossil
fuel based F and green energy G, with carbon emissions per unit of usage is
given by c and zero respectively. We also define α as the share of the growth
in the fossil fuel usage, and thereby, (1-α) depicting the share of the growth
of green energy. Let’s say  gives the efficiency of energy usage, then the
potential rate of growth gs and the carbon emission Cs in an economy can
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be calculated as follows,
E =F +G
O∗ =  · (F + G)
!
˙
Ȯ∗
Ḟ
= +α
+ (1 − α)
O∗

F

Ġ
G

!
(1)

gs = g + α · gf + (1 − α) · gg
 
F
Cs = α

For a developing country like India which has embarked on a high growth
trajectory, the basic proposition is that the frontier of maximum growth
should be greater than what the acceptable rate of growth is. Potential
(actual emissions depend on the actual growth rate etc) carbon emissions
can be controlled in three different ways. It can be done by increasing energy
efficiency g , increasing the rate of growth of production of green energy gg
and gradually moving away from fossil fuel dependence by decreasing α.
This policy can be understood in the form of a diagram, which has been
borrowed from Metcalf [1999].5 As the firms pollute more to increase their
production, its marginal benefit (MB curve in figure 1) falls with production
(emissions), which gives us a negatively sloped curve. The position of this
curve, however, depends on the underlying energy mix in the economy. In
the absence of a market price for carbon emissions, and hence a zero marginal
cost for the firms, they produce the maximum possible carbon emissions (Cs
in figure 1) associated with zero marginal benefits.
Supply side policy response to decrease emissions, through an overhaul
of the energy mix of any economy, shifts the MB curve inward to MB’ (see
figure 1). So, a fall in fossil fuel dependence (α) or an increase in efficiency
(), will shift the MB curve inward, thereby, decreasing the maximum possible carbon emissions from Cs to Cs0 . In the hypothetical case (hopefully
an actual case at some time in the future) where the fossil fuels have been
completely replaced by green energy (α = 0), the MB curve will disappear.
A detailed proposal on decreasing the dependence on fossil fuels (decreasing α) and increasing the efficiency of energy usage (increasing ) for
India has been presented in Pollin and Chakraborty [2015]. We present here
some of the salient features of that proposal:
5

Metcalf [1999] does not discuss the supply side policy since his major focus is on the
demand side control of emissions.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the Carbon Market
1. Raise the economy’s level of energy efficiency through the operations
of buildings, industry and transportation systems.
2. Among fossil fuel energy sources, increase the proportion of natural
gas consumption relative to coal, since carbon emissions from burning
natural gas are about one-half those from coal.
3. Invest in the development and commercialisation of some combination
of the following technologies:
(a) Clean renewables, including solar, wind, hydro, geothermal and
low-emissions bioenergy;
(b) Nuclear power;
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(c) Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) processes in generating
coal, oil, and natural gas-powered energy.
Of these three, the primary focus should be on 1 and 3 (a) above as
Pollin et al. [2015], Pollin [2015] have argued. Declining costs of production
of clean renewables and, hence, favourable prices are one of the important
reasons for why the transition from non-renewables to these is not altogether
unrealistic even in the short run. In fact the reliance on solar energy in the
rural areas in India is on a rise ever since the solar panels have become
relatively inexpensive. Pollin and Chakraborty [2015] have estimated that
the costs of generating electricity through clean renewables in India will be
25% lower than those in US. Based on this, they have calculated the level of
investment necessary to ensure a significant shift in the energy mix of India.
For raising energy efficiency, on the other hand, Pollin and Chakraborty
[2015] have assumed a conservative average figure for India of $11 billion per
Q-BTU of savings. They have futher argued that the “rebound effects” i.e.
increase in usage of energy on account of a fall in its cost, will cancel out
across different usages and in activities where it does not, carbon tax/cap
(as proposed below in detail) can be used.
Based on these estimates to fundamentally change the energy mix as
well as increasing efficiency of existing sources of energy usage in India,
Pollin and Chakraborty [2015] show that an additional 1.5% of the GDP
(to the existing 0.5% being spent currently on green energy) is required
assuming the Indian economy grows at an average of 6% over the period
under consideration. This includes developing the infrastructure required
to make these sources of energy accessible to those it does not reach at the
moment. For this paper, we borrow this figure for estimations made below.
3.1.2

Controlling Emissions from the Demand Side

The way the demand side works is to increase the marginal cost of carbon
emissions from zero to some positive number (Metcalf [1999]). There are two
alternative ways in which carbon emissions can be reduced from the demand
side: price rationing (carbon tax) or quantity rationing (carbon cap). Based
on the position of the new MB curve (determined by the supply side response
discussed above), a price rationing fixes the price of carbon (say t in figure
1) and lets the market decide the quantity of emissions whereas quantity
rationing (say C̄ in figure 1) fixes the quantity of emissions and lets the
market determine the price.
On the demand side, for India, we propose the policy of a carbon tax
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instead of a cap at least in the initial years of the implementation of the
environmental policy discussed here since it gives some room for the economy
to maneuver if the growth rate rises without imposing severe hardships on
the poor. When the correct energy mix has been achieved through supply
side policies, the economy can switch to a carbon cap policy.
The reason why this roadmap of transition from a tax to a cap is necessary is because of its effect on growth as well as equity. It can be seen
from the figure that in years when the rate of growth is higher than the
average rate assumed in the policy, the marginal benefit curve shifts in the
outward direction. A cap policy, by rationing the quantity of emissions, will
mean that not only will it not let the growth rate rise, it will have a severe
increase in the price of carbon (t), thereby, affecting the purchasing power
of the people. It is akin to the concept of stagflation. On the other hand, a
price rationing policy, which entails fixing the price of carbon at an exogenously given rate t while letting the market determine its quantity neither
affects the growth nor equity adversely although it has an adverse impact on
the environment since C̄ rises. In this paper, we have accounted for a high
6% average annual rate of growth for the next 20 years, so, on an average
an outward shift in MB as a result of higher growth rates in certain years
is more likely to be matched by an inward shift of MB resulting from lower
growth rates in other years. It’s safe to say, therefore, that the estimate of
carbon emissions, on the average, will not stray from the ones projected (C̄)
here.

3.2

Equity: The Right to Energy

As discussed above, the literature on distributional effects of carbon policy
can be divided in two groups: cap/tax and dividend and cap/tax and spend.
Our proposal belongs to the latter in terms of tax and spend but differs
significantly in its form.
We propose the spending on two counts, one of which is on changing the
energy mix as discussed in detail above. The other, which to our knowledge
has not been discussed in the existing literature, is to provide in kind transfer
by the government in the form of free energy upto a certain limit with those
crossing the limit paying the full price for all the units consumed. There
are many advantages to this policy over the policy of cash transfers in the
context of a developing economy like India.

13

3.2.1

Limitations of the Dividend Policy in a Developing Country

While cash transfers, generated through policies of ‘cap and distribute’ or
‘tax and distribute’, as dividends on a per capita basis in the North is a
remarkably egalitarian approach to green growth, it might not work in that
particular form for a developing country such as India. Let’s first see why
and then propose how those issues can be addressed.
1. Controlling emissions through tax/cap: There are other sources of
carbon emitting fuel consumption possible for the poor people (wood
burning etc), which can’t be controlled by this cap/tax policy because
these resources (cow dung cakes, wood) are freely available. So, any
tax or a cap policy for a resource which is not traded at all will have no
effect on its usage. What is needed is incentivising them to move away
from their current form of energy consumption and the only way that
can be achieved is by providing that at the same price (which is zero)
as their current forms of energy usage. There are also high opportunity
costs associated with the use of wood and cow dung, which is difficult
to measure. Hence alternative cleaner energy acts as a larger incentive
than what market price can capture.
2. Dividend distribution, which is essentially a universal cash transfer, is
not workable because:
(a) such a policy might only reach those with financial access, in
which case the policy will end up being quite regressive since, as
a result of a carbon tax, the costs will rise for the poor without
any commensurate increase in income.
(b) even if this were not the case, poor might not have an incentive
to move away from those sources of energy which are available to
them free of cost (wood burning) as against green energy which
will have a positive price.
3.2.2

Tax and Redistribute in Kind

What we propose below can be called ‘tax and redistribute in kind’.
Cash vs. Kind Cash transfers, as opposed to in-kind transfers, have
been debated extensively in the context of food in India. Since some of
the issues raised might be of relevance to our proposal, let us briefly discuss
these. Those in favour of the cash transfer and against in-kind transfers have
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argued that (a) it controls corruption since the money goes directly to the
bank account of the recipients as opposed to large scale leakages associated
with in-kind transfers; (b) it gives individuals the choice to spend on the
items based on their preference rather than the government directing the
preference of the recipients (Kotwal et al. [2011], Gulati and Saini [2015]).
Those opposed to cash transfers have argued that on both the counts
mentioned above, cash transfers are not preferable. As a means of tackling
corruption, existing cash transfer schemes in India such as old age pensions,
widow pensions or maternity entitlements show that a significant part of the
sum is given away as bribes to the middlemen. On the issue of corruption in
public distribution system (PDS), Somanathan [2015] shows through field
studies that leakages are miscalculated in government documents. On the
other hand, the very notion of fungibility has a problem of self-control since
the money can be spent ‘unwisely’, with expenditure on alcohol as the main,
but not the only, concern in India (Khera [2014]).
There are some additional problems with cash-transfers.
First, at a more philosophical level, Hausman and McPherson [1997]
argue that basic rights of access to resources should not be measured purely
in narrow utilitarian terms. Second, the access to banks, both in terms of
distance and knowledge of the system, is extremely limited in a country like
India on account of the thin spread of the current banking network in rural
India (one-third of the villages do not have banks within a radius of 5 kms)
and illiteracy respectively.
Third, not only inflation indexation of cash transfers may not be ‘technically simple’ (Deaton [2008]), they might not be frequent (Sinha [2015]).
Fourth, cash transfers by themselves can contribute to inflation in conditions where the supply of goods is inelastic, which might be the case if the
government stops procuring food for in-kind transfers (Khera [2014]).
Fifth, countries such as Brazil where cash transfer has been quite successful, it is complementary to and not a substitute for in-kind transfers. It
has succeeded there because the share of the rural population is significantly
lower as well as income levels and literacy rates are higher as compared to
India. Himanshu [2016] further argues “(g)iven the huge deficits in availability of public education and health facilities, universal basic income can
only increase the demand for these services without increasing the access to
these services.”
Our Proposal: The Right to Energy Vs Dividend Policy From the
discussion above, it’s clear that the proposal of carbon dividends, which is
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feasible in developed countries (Boyce and Riddle [2007]) will not likely work
in a developing country such as India.
What might work in India? We believe that a programme of universal
access to electricity and public transport, funded by carbon revenue, will
be a better substitute for a dividend policy. The broad contours of the
programme can be:
1. Upto certain units, energy usage will be free, which the government
finances from the revenue generated from carbon fee, after which the
prices, determined by the market, gradually go up. The basic entitlement to energy, the cutoff point, is determined by the climate injustice
quotient (CIQ), which measures the share of the carbon footprint of
classes as a proportion of their share in the population. There are both
economic and political basis for a CIQ based cutoff. Ananthapadmanabhan et al. [2007]’s study ‘clearly illustrates the growing schism of
carbon emissions between the two Indias; the poor bearing the biggest
climate impact burden and camouflaging the other India’s lifestyle
choices’. Our policy of providing free energy to those who contribute
less is a redressal to this injustice. It is shown below that as a result
of this policy there is a net gain for the bottom 7 deciles and net loss
for the top 3 deciles at the all-India level, which is commensurate with
their respective CIQs. This cutoff limit itself turns out not to be too
high in India because of gross inequality in energy usage across classes,
which also limits the tax burden on households.
2. Travel passes will be universally provided for an amount determined
by the loss on transportation budget that the bottom 70% of the population make on account of rising prices.
While all the objections raised above against cash transfers are valid in
our case too, our proposal of an in-kind transfer does not even suffer from the
criticisms made against the PDS in India. Both the objections of corruption
and lack of choice against an in-kind transfer are invalid in our case. Sinha
[2015] argues that experience of PDS from different states in India shows
‘wider coverage and lower prices can contribute to lower leakages’. Our
proposal takes care of both the issues of coverage, which is universal, and
prices, which is zero upto a certain limit. As far as increased usage due to
free availability is concerned, we have taken account of that by taking the
maximum possible free usage for the country as a whole.
It also addresses the problem of choice and its effect on the general wellbeing of the recipient. A cash transfer in the presence of energy available
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from nature such as wood/cow dung cake burning would not have persuaded
the poor into switching away from these sources of energy. With a zero price
of energy and universal access, not only will they shift towards healthier
forms of energy consumption, they will be better off even in the utilitarian
sense of saving time, which can be utilised for other activities.
One of the important issue usually raised with such policy programmes
is the manner in which it is to be financed. In the next section, we discuss
in details how this policy programme can be financed so that it eventually
balances the budget and does not put any additional expenditure on the
exchequer.

3.3

Financial contours of this policy

An appropriate combination of the supply-side policy, which attempts to
shift the MB curve inward, and demand-side policy, which determines the
position of the economy on the curve, can control carbon emissions in an
economy. Exclusive dependence on either will have higher emissions as can
be seen from figure 1. An exclusive dependence of demand side policy will
generate emission of Cd while an exclusive dependence on supply side policy
will result in Cs0 , which are both higher than C̄ arising out of a combination
of these policies.
As discussed above, Pollin and Chakraborty [2015] have shown that an
additional 1.5% of the GDP will be required to make the transition in energy
usage in India. This will affect the position of the MB curve discussed above.
Let us call this clean energy expenditure on changing the energy mix as well
as improving efficiency of usage from the supply side Gf ,
Gf = 1.5 · Y

(2)

The demand component of the policy, which fixes a carbon tax t, situates
the position of the economy on the MB curve. Let’s say the optimal carbon
path determined as a result of these two policies is C̄ (see figure 1) and
the tax rate which delivers it is given by t. We propose, like Boyce and
Riddle [2007, 2011], Fremstad and Paul [2017], that the tax is collected
‘upstream’ where carbon enters the economy i.e. mine heads, oil refineries
or ports since it has lower administrative costs while preventing leakage on
account of multiple layers of administration. The administrative cost of this
collection has been assumed to be 1 % of the tax revenue in the literature,
so, we make the same assumption. Let us call this total net revenue R,
which is given by,
R = tC̄ − 0.01tC̄ = 0.99tC̄
(3)
17

Government expenditure for providing this basic level of energy and
travel passes can be calculated in the following manner. Since the tax rates
are endogenous to the level of free energy and travel passes provided, it can
be determined in the following manner. If ē is the level of the cutoff in real
units of energy, say kWh, and ce is the carbon content embodied in it, and
its current price is pe , the expenditure on providing free energy is given by:
(pe + tce )ē. Similarly, if T is the cutoff level of transport expenditure in
nominal terms and ct is the carbon content embodied in it, the expenditure
on providing travel passes is given by: (1 + tct )T . Let us call the sum of
the two as the government expenditure on energy policy Ge . The other
component in the equation is Gf which represents the expenses for the
development of a clean energy infrastructure that will be required with the
provisions of universal energy usage, and thereby, an increased demand. As
discussed earlier, we derive this figure from a previous study (Pollin and
Chakraborty [2015]), where the authors presume additional investments in
clean renewable energy and energy efficiency at a rate of 1.5% of the GDP
(Y ) annually over a certain time period (around 20 years). Since we are
discussing a revenue neutral policy, the revenue of and the expense of the
government on this energy policy and the endogenously determined tax rates
is given by:
0.99tC̄ = Gf + Ge
0.99tC̄ = 1.5Y + (pe + tce )ē + (1 + tct )T
(4)
1.5Y + pe ē + T
t=
0.99C̄ − ce ē − ct T
Since we know the values of the variables on the right-hand side of the tax
equation above, this tax rate calculated endogenously enters the prices of
all the commodities, which affect the budget of all the households as shown
below. While the carbon tax imposes a financial burden on households, our
energy policy proposal more than compensates for this loss for the bottom
7 deciles of the population (results shown in detail below). It might also
induce those in the eighth decile who consume just above the cutoff limit to
bring their energy consumption down, thereby, benefitting from this policy.
Our results are in line with most of the literature on dividend policy which
finds that high expenditure (in absolute terms) of the upper deciles (mostly
the top 3) makes them net losers of this policy. But those who, to use
the phrase of Ananthapadmanabhan et al. [2007], ‘hide behind the poor’ in
carbon emissions, may have to pay for their lifestyle choices.
Alongside the domestic mobilization of the carbon tax, India, being a
low-income developing country, can also seek assistance from the advanced
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countries and development banks in the form of unconditional, low interest rate loans which will be later repaid back. It will help to reduce the
lag period of implementation of the proposed policy, which will otherwise
get delayed due to the lack of sufficient funds,and with the benefits of the
policy bearing immediate fruits, it will also help the progressive parties in
India to mobilize opinion in favor of these policies and carbon taxes. As
argued in Pollin and Chakraborty [2015], the recently established New Development Bank (NDB), whose founding members include India, along with
Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa, could play a leading role in such
inclusive green growth financing. With the recent political developments
of the Trump administration in the United States withdrawing itself from
the Paris Agreement, it provides an opportunity for the BRIC nations, particularly China, to play a leading role in the financing of the global green
growth programmes, especially for the developing world and project itself
as a world leader in the arena of clean green energy and climate change.

3.4

Infrastructure Development for the EPE Programme

1. So far we have not said anything about the actual implementation of
this policy except in terms of how to finance it. But what this policy
requires most attention to is developing the infrastructure to deliver
it to the needy sections of the population. As discussed above, as of
2014, more than 20 percent of the Indian population does not have
access to electricity with the scenario far more worse in the rural areas
where almost 30 percent of the population does not have any access
to electricity. More than 65 percent of the Indian population does not
have access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking.6 It is both
because of the lack of purchasing power as also the lack of availability
of electricity itself. So, while our in-kind transfer can take care of the
lack of purchasing power, it cannot address the lack of infrastructure
which will deliver this policy to the rural sections of the population.
What is required, therefore, is a comprehensive planning to increase
the infrastructure for delivering energy to every household in India.
We discuss this crucial component of our policy in this section.
2. What kind of infrastructure will be required for delivery of electricity
for residential (cooking, direct electricity consumption) purposes? As
far as renewables are concerned, following are the sources: solar, small
6
All statistics mentioned here are cited from World Development Indicators, World
Bank
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scale hydro, wind, biomass, geothermal and, if feasible, tidal energy.
Sukhatme [2012] in his ‘revised assessment’ shows that, contrary to
earlier views, it is now widely accepted that India has the potential to
meet all of India’s future demand for electricity from clean renewable
sources, assuming that the country also undertakes major investments
in energy conservation and efficiency. He makes this prediction for the
year 2070 when all the energy requirements can potentially be met by
renewable sources alone whereas our purpose is provision of electricity
from now. Our purpose is to provide electricity universally from now.
Therefore, infrastructural development will have to be of a kind which
can deliver electricity both from renewable and non-renewable sources.
Gradually the role of the latter needs to decline. In remote areas of
India, where on grid is cost-prohibitive, special emphasis needs to be
given to provide renewable energy, which by their nature is relatively
easy to produce in the vicnity of the source of consumption.
3. But just this production is not enough, its delivery at all hours of
the day according to its demand is a difficult challenge since the production of electricity from renewable sources varies through the day.
Sukhatme [2012], therefore, suggests mechanisms and technological innovation as necessary conditions to ensure storage and minimum loss
transmission of power generated from the plant to the household. To
smoothly deliver the EPE policy, the renewable sources infrastructure will have to be supplemented with storage batteries to provide
electricity throughout the day and, if required, complemented with
non-renewable sources in the grid.Composition of power will have to
be such that the electricity generated through non-renewables and
renewables vary in a way that the overall production is evened out
during a given day. To minimise carbon emissions, the grids can be so
designed that the electricity generated through non-renewables kicks
in only after the renewables are exhausted during a day. This might
vary from day to day depending on weather conditions, for eg. lack
of wind, an overcast day but since we are taking into account the
backup being provided by non-renewables (at least upto that stage
when technology and infrastructure is developed enough to meet the
entire demand through renewables alone), delivery of electricity round
the clock should not be an issue.
4. India has huge potential of renewable energy sources. According to a
recent World Bank study, India has the potential of 150GW of genera-
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tion capacity through renewable sources (Sargsyan et al. [2011]). The
report also states that the economy’s renewable energy potential is
even greater than the 150 GW estimated till date since resources from
sources with significant generation capacity (such as energy plantation
of wastelands, offshore wind farms and tidal energy sources) have not
yet been mapped. In some of the established sectors like wind, solar
and small hydropower, the latest developments in engineering design
and equipment technology are also likely to increase potential along
with the discovery of new small hydropower sites and the development of the irrigation network. In 2011, India had the fifth largest
capacity for wind energy in the world in 2011. On shore wind energy
has the largest potential at 49GW, particularly in the states of Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh(International Energy Agency
[2015]). According to IRENA’s recent study, India can raise its final
renewable energy use to approximately 8.8 quads by 2030, which is
way higher than our earlier projections made in the paper(Pollin and
Chakraborty [2015]). It shows that the targets which we have proposed in the eaerlier study can be easily achievable if these policies are
put in place.
5. According to recent statistics available as of June 2017, India has installed 58.3 GW of renewable energy out of a total installed capacity
of 330.3 GW which is approximately around 17.7 percent of the total
installed capacity. These renewable energy sources, however,exclude
large hydro, which is 44.6 GW. Within the renewable energy sources,
small hydropower constitutes 4.4 GW, wind power constitutes 32.5
GW, biomass power and co-generation is 8.2 GW, waste to energy
constitutes 1.1 GW and solar power makes up the remaining 13.1 GW
of installed renewable energy capacity in India. So, as per the recent
statistics, India has been able to utilize only one-third of it’s known
renewable energy capacity.7 It shows that India has a lot of scope in
expanding the renewable energy capacity whose benefits are not only
confined to the provision of clean energy, but with the development
of these renewable infrastructures, the benefits also spill over to other
sectors of the economy as noted by some recent case studies (Mehta
[2009], Baruah [2014]).
6. In a report published by the Indian Institute of Public Administration
7
All data in this section has been cited from Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of
Power, Government of India.
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(IIPA), also acting as an implementing agent for the MNRE-UNDPFRG Renewable Energy for Livelihoods Project in 14 villages in 6
districts of the states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, it reports that
the development of renewable energy sources facilitated in reducing
poverty through improved quality of life and increased livelihood opportunities in these remote, non-electrified villages of India that were
not likely to get electricity from the grid(Mehta [2009]). In all the
14 villages studied, these developments improved the quality of life of
the common people through providing clean energy for lighting, cooking and motive power and also building capacity, facilitating livelihood
generation and, in many cases, enabling access to education and health
facilities. With the support of local community and grass root technicians, this project implemented various new and renewable energy
infrastructures like solar lanterns and cookers, solar home lightning
and street lightning, small hydropower based lightning, biomass gasifier and biogas for drudgery reduction. As required under the program
and due to the various linkage effects, gasifier sheds, powerhouses, solar
repairing workshops, livelihood equipment sheds, water tanks, roads
and schools had been constructed. As noted in the report, this aided
the implementing agencies in building capacity, raising awareness, conducting training and skill provisioning, organising health camps and
schools and facilitating access to income earning opportunities available through implementation of the NREGS program.
7. As suggested in the earlier study (Pollin and Chakraborty [2015]),
and also, incorporating some important policies prescribed in a recent
report published by the Planning Commission (Government of India
[2014]), this study also proposes some areas of infrastructural development which has huge scopes of improving energy efficiency in the near
future:
(a) Building weatherisation and construction industry has huge scope
for improvement in energy efficiency of the residential sector, specially in a time when 70 percent of the building stock in India by
the year 2030 has been estimated to be built over the period 2011
to 2030. The strengthening of the Energy Conservation Building
Code will create a policy environment which will provide further
incentives to promote uptake of green buildings and opt for energy efficient options in their buildings.
(b) Improvements in industrial energy efficiency presents an opportu22

nity for considerable energy savings in India, especially in the iron
and steel industry and the cement industry, which are the most
energy intensive manufacturing sectors of the economy. The already existing Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme, which
is an outcome of the National Manufacturing Policy coupled with
the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency, can be a
major driver for improving energy efficiency in the energy intensive industries. As of recently available statistics till May 2017,
Cycle 1 of PAT’s three cycle scheme has achieved an energy savings of 0.35 quads of energy against the targeted energy savings of
0.27 quads (Bureau of Energy Efficiency [2017]). Combined with
the proposed Energy Conservation Fund and a dedicated spending of 0.5 percent of GDP towards improving energy efficiency,
India has a huge potential in saving energy and improving energy
efficiency.
(c) The other sector which has a huge potential of improving energy
efficiency in India is the transport sector, which accounts for more
than half of India’s petroleum consumption, and a quarter of the
overall energy needs(Government of India [2014]). India’s railway
infrastructure is already developed and, therefore, primary emphasis should be on further increasing it’s efficiency like raising
frequency of the semi-high-speed trains for inter-city transport
and developing freight corridors, which will help to improve it’s
modal share in both passenger and freight transport. The other
possible areas of improvement of energy efficiency in the transportation sector include massive expansion of the public transport, dedicated lanes for public vehicles like Rapid Transit Corridor in urban areas and also dedicated bike lanes for bikes and
rickshaws, promoting electric/hybrid mobility and improving the
fuel efficiency of both light and heavy vehicles.
We believe that, if properly implemented, this policy proposal, in its
entirety, has an immense potential of providing electricity to every
household in India with a minimum consumption guaranteed without
any cost to the household. Of course any consumption beyond that
limit will be charged in full to avoid wastage of electricity as well as
curbing carbon emissions arising out of such wastage.
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3.5

Benefits of the EPE Programme

1. Every household in India will have equal access to electricity, a feat
that almost all the governments since independence have dreamt about
but never managed to deliver.
2. This policy also delivers on providing more employment since the employment elasticity in greener forms of energy is higher than those
in fossil fuel based energy. It has been calculated elsewhere that the
loss of employment in the fossil fuel based energy sectors will be more
than compensated for by increase in employment in renewables-based
sectors (Pollin and Chakraborty [2015])
3. Availability of free energy (upto a limit) addresses the issue of stealing
of electricity for consumption since there will be no incentive left for
those stealing at the moment. In India, even in 2014, about 0.8%
worth of GDP is estimated to stolen electricity through corrupt means
(Emerging Markets Smart Grid: Outlook 2015). Theft costs the Indian
power sector almost $16.2 billion per year, which is the highest in the
world. Our policy addresses such a leakage squarely.
4. Higher prices of fossil fuels as a result of the carbon tax will percolate
down to commodities according to their carbon content and, hence,
induce households, including the rich, to look for substitutes in green
energy since even the highest price of green energy based products will
more likely be lower than the increased price of fossil fuels.
5. Most importantly, it has the effect of enticing even the poor to move
away from traditional forms of energy consumption because the price
of energy will be zero for them (ensured by the fact that the policy
sets the cutoff at a level higher that their current energy consumption)
as compared to a shadow positive price, which they spend in terms of
time used for collection of wood/cow dung cakes etc. So, not only
does our proposal provide pecuniary benefits to the poor, it also has
additional benefits in terms of improving the quality of family life and
providing time for other household activities.
6. The health impact of outdoor air pollution in India costs about 3% of
India’s annual gross domestic product, and indoor air pollution adds
significantly to this total. The World Health Organization estimates
that the number of deaths from ambient air pollution stands at 621138
in 2012, the second highest in the world after China. According to the
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same data, household air pollution attributable deaths totaled to more
than 1.25 million deaths in 2012. Besides, 400 million Indians (90%
of them women) are exposed to respiratory, pulmonary and vision
hazards associated with indoor air pollution from burning traditional
biofuels for cooking.8
7. On the supply side, the distribution of the overall energy subsidy to
the providers of energy could be in proportion to their green energy
mix. This will incentivise the move towards green energy, which will
also have repercussions towards cheaper technological innovations.

4

Methodology and Data

4.1

Methodology

The methodology used in the paper is similar to the existing literature
(Fremstad and Paul [2017]). To calculate the carbon content in individual commodities, as well as the employment potential of a given sector in
the economy, the input-output tables for India, have been used. The Right
to Energy programme requires two steps: calculating the carbon content
and its impact on the household budget. For the former, IO data is used,
and for the latter, the national sample survey (NSS) data is used to estimate the consumption of different deciles of the households. Commodities
of consumption in the NSS have been recategorised to match with the IO
specification available for India.
Step 1: To calculate the effect of a carbon tax on the price of a commodity,
we borrow the methodology used in Fremstad and Paul [2017] to estimate
the carbon content. Calculating carbon content in a commodity requires
us to find the amount embodied in it of the ultimate commodity i.e. the
commodity through which carbon enters the system. We can safely assume
that fuel and energy and mining in the case of India are the two sectors
which introduce carbon to the system. We combine these two sectors and
treat them as one sector called energy in the input-output table. We need to
first find the amount of energy embodied in a commodity and then multiply
it by the amount of carbon emitted by a unit of energy to derive its carbon
content.
Two steps are employed to find the energy content in any commodity.
The direct content dcej is simply the amount of the energy sector going into
8

This discussion has benefited immensely from IRENA [2017].
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producing one unit of that commodity (e and j in dcej represent the energy
sector and the sector which produces the commodity under consideration
respectively). There is an indirect carbon content too, which enters a commodity through the other commodities that have gone into its production.
The sum of these gives us the total content (tcej ) of carbon of a commodity,
which can be calculated from the Leontief inverse matrix in the following
manner, where DC and TC are respectively the matrices of direct and total
content of commodities as inputs to commodities as outputs and, I is the
identity matrix.
TC = (I − DC)−1
(5)
Each of the elements tcij in TC represent the amount of commodity i entering as an input for production of a unit of commodity j. By implication
the tcej represent the amount of energy embodied in each commodity j, so,
the energy row of the TC matrix gives us the total content of energy in
each of the commodities. To find out the carbon content in commodity j,
we multiply it by the amount of carbon (ce ) emitted by a unit of energy,
cj = tcej · ce

(6)

The increase in price of a commodity j as a result of a tax t imposed on
carbon can then be calculated by multiplying this tax rate with the total
carbon embodied in a commodity,
pnew
= pold
j
j + cj · t

(7)

This increase in prices can then be used to calculate its adverse impact on
the budget of a household.
Step 2: The budget of the household is derived from the NSS survey.
The NSS survey gives details of expenditure for a household across a whole
range of commodities defined at a very detailed level. Since our attempt is
to find the carbon content of these commodities, we have recategorised them
in a way which is commensurate with the IO level of disaggregation. We
have divided the commodities into eight categories and found the respective
industries in the IO table and the commodities in the NSS survey to match
that. The exact codes used for this match from the respective sources is
provided in table 8 of the appendix.
With this match, the carbon content and the price rise can now be
calculated across these eight consumption categories based on equations 6
and 7. The total carbon content of these eight categories of commodities is
reported in table 1.
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Table 1: Carbon Content of Commodities of Consumption
Consumption
Categories
Food
Clothing & Footwear
Industrial Goods
Housing
Fuel & Electricity
Transport
Medical & Education
Misc Services

Gross Output
(million USD)

Carbon Content
(MTCO2/USD)

567657.4
105377.6
815446.8
539160.0
321455.4
267475.4
126971.5
900121.4

0.0003
0.0011
0.0028
0.0018
0.0135
0.0027
0.0004
0.0004

Source: Authors’ Calculation (see text for details)
The effect of a carbon tax varies across income categories of households,
so, we divide the NSS population in deciles and study the effect of this tax
on their budget and then compensate both for free energy and travel passes
to see the net impact of our programme on these deciles. We also report the
overlap between class and caste to show the progressive effects of our policy
on the socio-economic fabric of India.

4.2

Data sources

We use the latest NSS 68th round unit level data (survey done in 2011-12)
and the corresponding source for the Input-Output table is OECD database.
NSS schedule 1.0 has been used for consumption related data.

5

Results

Table 2 presents the per capita annual expenditure on different consumption
categories for each decile at the all India level. Certain features of the consumption pattern are noteworthy. First, there is a significant inequality in
consumption with the richest (top decile) consuming almost ten times than
the poorest (lowest decile). Since consumption propensities out of income
fall with income, the inequality in income will be even starker (NSS does not
collect information on total income). Second, the general Engel’s law holds
i.e. as the income rises, consumption on food as a share of total falls. Since
food has the lowest carbon content among commodities (see table 1), we can
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expect that the carbon footprint of the poorest will be the lowest and gradually rises with income of the households. Third, other than food, fuel and
electricity, the consumption inequality rises quite dramatically, which shows
the deprivation of the poorest in India. Fourth, even among the richest, the
top decile consumes more than double the amount than the ninth decile.
Table 2: Total Annual Per Capita Expenditure in India (in USD)
Commodities
HH
Size

Total
Expenses

Food

Clothing

Indus.
Goods

Housing

Fuel &
Elec.

Trans.

Med. &
Educ.

Misc

Deciles
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

6.5
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.5
5.3
5.1
4.8
4.2
5.5

137.06
182.85
215.85
246.71
282.23
324.06
378.07
456.09
594.18
1294.55
411.17

87.62
113.55
130.80
145.74
161.52
180.00
200.75
226.21
267.72
386.39
190.03

5.36
9.75
12.00
15.85
19.77
23.46
27.40
36.58
49.44
93.84
29.34

8.90
12.15
14.75
17.49
20.69
24.44
29.46
36.99
52.16
238.17
45.52

0.12
0.41
0.65
1.15
1.89
2.91
5.50
10.17
23.21
88.23
13.42

19.63
22.81
25.92
27.54
29.99
33.25
36.50
40.50
46.92
68.26
35.13

2.69
4.42
6.41
8.43
11.17
14.61
20.12
28.47
43.54
104.99
24.48

6.88
10.52
13.66
16.30
19.74
23.83
32.77
44.99
65.65
196.54
43.09

5.86
9.23
11.67
14.19
17.46
21.56
25.58
32.20
45.54
118.13
30.14

Source: Authors’ Calculation based on 68th Round of NSS

Variation in the composition of total expenditure across deciles is going
to affect various classes differently in terms of their net gain or loss as a
result of the carbon tax and the benefits of the policy. In the Indian case,
however, there is an additional layer of discrimination other than income i.e.
caste, which needs to be taken into account while discussing the progressive
implications of this policy. Table 3 presents the share of different castes in
each of these income deciles, and the results are a stark reminder of the
double discrimination that the oppressed sections of the Indian population
face. Ten percent of the population (STs) has double its share in poverty.
Two third of the population (STs, SCs and OBCs) constitute ninety percent
of the poorest (based on the lowest decile). These figures also show that a
policy, such as ours, which is progressive in terms of income will also be
progressive in terms of the caste hierarchy. That is not to say that a purely
income-based policy can address social oppression but it will surely improve
their economic well-being.
To understand the effect of our policy in regional terms, we need to see
the consumption patterns across urban and rural India. Table 4 shows the
composition of consumption differentiated between rural and urban India.
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Table 3: Intersectionalities of Caste and Class
Share of Each Caste (in %)
Decile

Scheduled
Tribes (ST)

Scheduled
Castes (SC)

Other Backward
Castes (OBC)

Upper
Castes

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

21.9
13.0
10.9
9.4
8.1
7.6
6.5
5.1
3.9
2.8
8.9

27.6
24.4
23.6
20.6
20.3
18.2
16.8
16.8
13.2
9.0
19.0

40.7
44.2
45.8
47.4
47.0
48.6
45.8
44.4
42.6
34.1
44.1

9.8
18.4
19.8
22.5
24.6
25.5
31.0
33.7
40.3
54.1
28.0

Source: Authors’ Calculation based on 68th Round of NSS
Instead of the absolute amount, we present the share of commodities in
the total consumption to make the regional comparison easier to interpret.
The overall pattern of inequality of consumption remains similar but the
variation is higher in the urban than the rural areas. As a share in total
expenditure, the urban households spend almost fifteen times more on housing than their rural counterparts, which could be on account of the relative
housing cost. Again as a share in total expenditure, the rural elite consumes
almost half the amount on miscellaneous services in comparison to the urban
elite. This could be on account of the shifting pattern of consumption from
other consumption categories (for eg. food) to services within the richest in
the urban areas in contrast to their rural counterparts.
For an analysis of the energy policy proposed here, we need to calculate
the carbon charge that the households will have to bear as against the benefits they derive from this policy. To calculate the carbon charge, i.e. the
increase in the cost of living of the households as a result of a carbon tax (t),
we need to find out the carbon footprint of each of these deciles. It can be
calculated by multiplying their expenditure on commodities (from table 2)
by the carbon content embodied in each of those commodities (from table
1). This gives us the carbon footprint per capita across the deciles (table 5).
Our study corroborates the existing studies on stark inequality in carbon
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Table 4: Annual Per Capita Expenditure in Rural and Urban India
Expenses
(USD)
Deciles

Share in
Total

Share of Total Expenditures in Each Decile
(%)

(%)

Food

Clothing

Indus.
Goods

Housing

Fuel &
Elec.

Trans.

Med &
Edu

Misc

Rural
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

129.8
170.6
199.0
225.3
251.1
282.8
321.0
373.3
459.1
876.5
328.9

3.9
5.2
6.1
6.9
7.6
8.6
9.8
11.4
14.0
26.7
100.0

64.2
62.9
61.8
60.4
59.0
57.4
56.1
53.9
49.8
34.9
56.0

3.9
5.0
5.6
6.0
6.9
7.5
7.8
8.2
9.3
8.6
6.9

6.4
6.6
6.7
7.0
7.1
7.5
7.6
8.0
8.4
20.9
8.6

0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.6
1.2
0.3

14.7
12.8
12.2
11.7
11.0
10.5
10.2
9.5
8.6
5.5
10.6

1.9
2.2
2.7
3.2
3.5
4.0
4.3
5.1
6.4
6.3
4.0

4.9
5.7
5.9
6.3
6.7
7.0
7.3
8.5
10.3
16.7
7.9

4.1
4.8
5.0
5.4
5.7
6.0
6.4
6.5
6.6
5.9
5.6

Urban
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

181.7
251.6
306.5
360.2
419.8
490.6
577.5
701.9
916.2
1964.2
617.0

2.9
4.1
5.0
5.8
6.8
8.0
9.4
11.4
14.8
31.8
100.0

60.6
57.4
55.2
52.6
50.1
47.8
45.3
42.4
38.2
25.1
47.5

4.3
4.8
5.2
5.3
5.6
6.5
6.8
7.5
7.6
6.7
6.0

6.7
6.9
7.0
7.1
7.8
7.5
7.7
8.2
9.0
18.0
8.6

1.4
2.3
2.7
3.5
4.5
5.2
6.5
6.9
7.8
10.1
5.1

13.0
11.8
10.8
10.2
9.7
9.0
8.4
7.8
7.2
4.7
9.3

2.3
3.5
4.5
5.5
5.9
6.4
7.1
8.0
8.7
9.4
6.1

6.0
6.6
7.4
8.5
8.7
9.6
9.9
10.2
11.0
15.0
9.3

5.7
6.6
7.2
7.3
7.7
8.0
8.3
9.0
10.4
11.0
8.1

Source: Authors’ Calculation based on 68th Round of NSS
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emissions in India (Michael and Vakulabharanam [2016], Ananthapadmanabhan et al. [2007]). For every dollar spent, the richest in India emit eight
times more carbon that the poorest and within the richest the top decile
emits more than double what the ninth decile does.
To determine the cut off for the distribution of our dividend policy, we
need to calculate the climate injustice quotient (CIQ), which measures the
ratio of carbon footprints of a section of the population to its share in total
population. Here, we take the proportion of the carbon footprints of the
individual deciles in the total footprint and divide it by their share in the
population. The last column of table 5 gives us these figures, which shows
that the bottom seven deciles emit lesser carbon than their share in the
population (CIQ<1) and the top three deciles emit more than their share
in the population (CIQ>1).
Table 5: Carbon Footprint and the Climate Injustice Quotient
Deciles

Footprint
per capita

HH
Size

Footprint
per HH

Share in
Footprint

CIQ

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

0.34
0.41
0.47
0.52
0.58
0.66
0.75

6.5
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.5
5.3

2.18
2.58
2.84
3.07
3.38
3.64
4.00

0.053
0.062
0.068
0.074
0.081
0.088
0.096

0.53
0.62
0.68
0.74
0.81
0.88
0.96

8
9
10

0.89
1.12
2.37

5.1
4.8
4.2

4.52
5.37
9.95

0.109
0.129
0.240

1.09
1.29
2.40

As discussed earlier, the cutoff level of free energy consumption (fuel and
electricity plus transport) that this policy needs to provide for is determined
by the CIQ. Our policy attempts to redress this inequality of carbon emission by providing for free fuel and electricity to those whose CIQ is less than
one while those with CIQ greater than one pay the full price of fuel and
electricity. So, the widening schism between the two countries co-existing
side by side i.e. Bharat, which bears the climate impact burden, and India,
which imposes that burden because of their lifestyle choices, is justly addressed with the latter being taxed to compensate the former for the loss.
The nature of this transfer is the free energy benefit that the bottom seven
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deciles get.
For fuel and electricity, we use the median per capita real consumption
of the seventh decile, which is 412 kWh per year9 , and multiply it by the
average size of the household, which is 5.5. Based on this, the free entitlement
of fuel and electricity for a household comes out to be 2268 kWh per annum
or 189 kWh per month. Consumption of electricity beyond this limit is
going to be charged in full. Therefore, this policy benefits only those who
keep their consumption lower than this level while the others pay the higher
prices for all units of consumption.
The rise in transport expenditure can be compensated for by providing
travel passes with pre-loaded balance amount which can be used on any
mode of public transport, irrespective of whether it runs as private or public initiatives. In our opinion, however, expansion of an inexpensive public
transport run by the government is a must for any country which seeks to
provide for a decent livelihood to its population. But this policy is not
contingent on the provision of this service only by public means since these
travel passes can be used on any means of public transport. The way this
compensation works is that each individual will be issued travel passes carrying minimum nominal sum equivalent to the median value of transport
incurred after the carbon tax has come into effect. We are aware that this
aspect of our policy might be difficult to implement in rural areas where
public transport infrastructure itself might be non-existent. Nevertheless,
since the other part of this policy, which is the expenditure on developing a
green economy, also discusses at length the provision for public transport,
this discussion should be seen as a complement to that.
Through this exercise, we have got all the relevant information required
on the right-hand side of equation 4, which will help us calculate the level of
tax required per unit of carbon for this policy to come into effect. Unlike in
the other studies in the literature on cap and dividend, where the tax rate is
given exogenously, in our case, there is an endogeneity involved because the
tax rate is on both sides of the equation. The level of carbon tax required for
this policy to come into effect is USD 60.4 per metric ton of carbon dioxide.
As a result of this tax, the average price of electricity rises from USD 0.08
to USD 0.10 per kWh.
The next step is to find the effect of this tax on the budget of the
9

This has been calculated by dividing the nominal median value of energy consumption
of the seventh decile i.e. USD 34, by the current price of electricity, i.e. USD 0.0825/kWh,
taken from the Ministry of Power. We take median as opposed to the mean for distribution
of electricity on the principle that median is representative of a majority of the household’s
consumption of fuel and electricity in that decile.
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households i.e. the carbon charge. To calculate the carbon charge on a
particular commodity, we need to know the total carbon content in that
commodity i.e. not just the direct but also the indirect carbon content.
Once this total is known, the price effect calculated is quite robust (at least
in the sense of a given state of technology given by the IO coefficients) and
not an approximate measure, which is what the direct content calculation
would have yielded. The calculation that follows, therefore, is the closest
estimate one can achieve for the effect of a carbon tax on the households.
We use table 5 and the tax rate to calculate the per capita carbon charge for
these deciles (see the carbon charge column in table 6). Since the footprint
increases with the deciles, the absolute amount of carbon charge increases
in the same manner, but it is regressive in the relative sense since the charge
as a proportion of household expenses falls with income.
It is in this context that the progressive aspect of our policy kicks in. The
benefit is divided into two parts of electricity and cooking and transport on
the lines of the discussion above. Since free electricity is easily distributable
per household unlike per capita as it avoids the identification problem usually associated with in-kind transfers, the entitlement is at the household
level. So, we report the benefit figures both at the per capita as well as the
household level. On the other hand, the transport benefits are distributed
at per capita level. It can be seen from table 6 that the total energy benefit
per household are distributed quite progressively with the highest benefit
associated with the poorest, and it falls with income.10 For the top three
deciles, the only benefits they are entitled to are transport charges.
The net benefits are derived by subtracting the carbon charge associated
with the respective deciles from the total energy benefits. It can be seen
that it is progressive both in per capita and per household terms. At the
household level, this is so for two reasons. While the total energy benefits fall
with income, the carbon charge rises. It is progressive even at the per capita
level because the fall in total energy benefits is more than compensated for
by the rise in the carbon charge. The last three columns in table 6 represent
the carbon charge, energy benefit and net benefit as a share of the total
expenses of the respective households.
The calculation of benefits so far has been based on the assumption of
maximum possible benefits (potential) the households can derive from this
policy i.e. by consuming the maximum possible free energy available to
10

The reason why there is a reversal in the trend of energy benefits in per capita versus
household terms is because the underlying principle of distribution of electricity is at the
household level, which means that benefit per capita will, by the way policy is constructed,
decrease with the size of the household.
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Table 6: Potential and Minimum Benefits of the Households
Deciles

Per Capita
Expenses

Household

Electricity &
Cooking
(in USD)

Transport

(in USD)

Carbon
Charge
(in USD)

Potential
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

137.1
182.8
215.8
246.7
282.2
324.1
378.1
456.1
594.2
1294.6

20.3
24.7
28.6
31.5
35.2
40.0
45.6
53.5
67.6
143.1

Minimum
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

137.1
182.8
215.8
246.7
282.2
324.1
378.1
456.1
594.2
1294.6

20.3
24.7
28.6
31.5
35.2
40.0
45.6
53.5
67.6
143.1

Share of Expenses

Net
Benefit
(in USD)

Size

(in USD)

Energy
Benefit
(in USD)

Energy
Benefit
(in USD)

Net
Benefit
(in USD)

Carbon
Charge
(in %)

Energy
Benefit
(in %)

Net
Benefit
(in %)

34.9
36.0
37.8
38.4
39.1
41.2
42.8
0.0
0.0
0.0

17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9

52.8
53.9
55.7
56.3
57.0
59.1
60.7
17.9
17.9
17.9

32.5
29.2
27.1
24.9
21.8
19.2
15.1
-35.6
-49.7
-125.2

6.5
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.5
5.3
5.1
4.8
4.2

343.2
339.6
334.2
332.4
330.6
325.3
321.7
91.3
85.9
75.2

211.2
184.0
162.5
146.9
126.3
105.4
80.0
-181.6
-238.4
-525.9

14.8
13.5
13.3
12.7
12.5
12.3
12.1
11.7
11.4
11.1

38.5
29.5
25.8
22.8
20.2
18.2
16.1
3.9
3.0
1.4

23.7
16.0
12.5
10.1
7.7
5.9
4.0
-7.8
-8.4
-9.7

19.6
22.8
25.9
27.5
30.0
33.2
36.5
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.7
4.4
6.4
8.4
11.2
14.6
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9

22.3
27.2
32.3
36.0
41.2
47.9
54.4
17.9
17.9
17.9

2.0
2.5
3.7
4.5
5.9
7.9
8.8
-35.6
-49.7
-125.2

6.5
6.3
6.0
5.9
5.8
5.5
5.3
5.1
4.8
4.2

145.1
171.6
194.0
212.2
238.7
263.2
288.3
91.3
85.9
75.2

13.2
16.0
22.3
26.7
34.4
43.4
46.7
-181.6
-238.4
-525.9

14.8
13.5
13.3
12.7
12.5
12.3
12.1
11.7
11.4
11.1

16.3
14.9
15.0
14.6
14.6
14.8
14.4
3.9
3.0
1.4

1.5
1.4
1.7
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.3
-7.8
-8.4
-9.7

Source: Authors’ Calculation (see text for details)

them. However, a question could be raised that this is not in line with their
current consumption. To cover that possibility, we also report the minimum
possible benefits that the bottom seven deciles can derive from this policy by
using their current actual consumption of fuel and electricity and transport.
What if they continue to consume their current levels? Will they still
benefit? And the table tells us that even in this minimum sense, even the
poorest households, despite the currently abysmal levels of energy consumption, gain as a result of this policy (see Table 2). If we add to that the implicit
health and time benefits associated with our policy, which have obviously
not been included in the overall structure of benefits, we can safely say that
at the very least the bottom seven deciles gain from this policy even if they
were to continue consuming the same level of energy as they do today.
Given the current levels of very low consumption of fuel and electricity
and transport by the lower deciles, it is safe to argue that the actual consumption as a result of this progressive policy will lie somewhere between
the minimum and the potential benefits. In such a situation, the real benefit
structure would, by and large, remain the same as the potential benefits. It
will also lift the living standards up of the lower deciles since they will now
have access to clean forms of energy, whereas currently, they have to depend
on wood burning, etc. for their sustenance.
We now discuss the benefits of the Right to Energy policy at a regional
level (see table 7) by dividing the population into rural and urban areas.
The effect of this policy across the geographical regions is varied.
First, having determined the cutoff level of free electricity available to the
households based on the CIQ, we find that because electricity consumption
of the urban household is relatively higher than their rural counterparts, the
free cut-off limit is crossed by the sixth decile household itself in the urban
area. This has the implication that while bottom 70 percent gain from this
policy in the rural areas, it’s only the bottom 50 percent of households in
the urban areas who will be net gainers of this policy.
Second, in per capita terms, the rural poor gain more than their urban
counterpart. Even in terms of net benefits, rural households fare better in
both per capita and household terms. The is because of the lower per capita
carbon charge in the rural areas, which means a lower footprint of a rural
household in comparison to their urban counterpart.
In terms of net benefits as a share of the expenses, the rural households
stand to gain more than their urban counterparts both because of higher
net benefits as well as lower relative expenses.
We can safely say that our policy is not only progressive from a class
perspective, it is also progressive when seen in terms of regional deprivation.
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Table 7: Regionwise Potential Benefits of the Households
Deciles

Per Capita
Expenses

Household

Electricity &
Cooking
(in USD)

Transport

(in USD)

Carbon
Charge
(in USD)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

129.8
170.6
199.0
225.3
251.1
282.8
321.0
373.3
459.1
876.5

19.5
23.3
26.5
29.4
31.7
34.9
39.2
44.4
52.6
95.5

Urban
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

181.7
251.6
306.5
360.2
419.8
490.6
577.5
701.9
916.2
1964.2

25.4
33.5
39.1
45.1
51.7
58.8
67.7
80.9
104.0
216.1

Share of Expenses

Net
Benefit
(in USD)

Size

(in USD)

Energy
Benefit
(in USD)

Energy
Benefit
(in USD)

Net
Benefit
(in USD)

Carbon
Charge
(in %)

Energy
Benefit
(in %)

Net
Benefit
(in %)

34.4
36.0
37.2
39.1
39.8
39.8
41.2
0.0
0.0
0.0

17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9

52.3
53.9
55.1
57.0
57.7
57.7
59.1
17.9
17.9
17.9

32.7
30.6
28.6
27.6
25.9
22.7
19.9
-26.5
-34.7
-77.6

6.6
6.3
6.1
5.8
5.7
5.7
5.5
5.2
5.0
4.6

344.9
339.5
336.0
330.6
328.8
328.8
325.2
93.1
89.5
82.3

215.9
192.5
174.4
160.2
147.8
129.6
109.7
-137.9
-173.6
-357.1

15.1
13.7
13.3
13.0
12.6
12.4
12.2
11.9
11.5
10.9

40.2
31.6
27.7
25.3
23.0
20.4
18.4
4.8
3.9
2.0

25.2
17.9
14.4
12.3
10.3
8.0
6.2
-7.1
-7.6
-8.9

33.3
36.6
38.4
39.8
42.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9

51.2
54.5
56.3
57.7
60.7
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9
17.9

25.8
21.0
17.3
12.6
8.9
-40.9
-49.8
-63.0
-86.1
-198.2

6.8
6.2
5.9
5.7
5.3
5.1
4.8
4.5
4.1
3.9

348.5
337.7
332.4
328.8
321.6
91.3
85.9
80.6
73.4
69.8

175.6
130.0
101.9
72.0
47.4
-208.4
-238.8
-283.5
-352.9
-773.0

14.0
13.3
12.7
12.5
12.3
12.0
11.7
11.5
11.3
11.0

28.2
21.6
18.4
16.0
14.5
3.6
3.1
2.6
2.0
0.9

14.2
8.3
5.6
3.5
2.1
-8.3
-8.6
-9.0
-9.4
-10.1

Rural
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Source: Authors’ Calculation (see text for details)

If we add the information available on the caste-class overlap in table 3, then
the policy turns out to be progressive in three different, i.e. caste, class and
region, but interdependent senses.

6

Conclusion

This paper argues that an environmental policy can be devised which by
its very structure delivers equitable and sustainable growth without giving up on its pace. It draws upon the literature on green growth, tax/cap
and dividend policy, which have been under extensive debate and political considerations in the advanced countries. While the energy mix of the
growth process changes in favour of clean sources through investment in
green energy as well as controlling demand for fossil fuels through a carbon
tax/cap, distribution of the tax revenue in the form of universal access to
energy makes the process egalitarian. This will also solve one of the oldest
problems of low levels of electrification in India.
Our results show that protecting the environment without sacrificing
growth is something entirely achievable for a developing country like India. While in the advanced economies, there are already many instances
of carbon tax being levied, the developing countries are yet to experience
any such real implementations of an environmental tax. The main concern
among the politicians and the policymakers in developing countries is that
an environmental tax will bring additional hardship to the poor given that
these taxes are usually regressive in nature. However, this study shows that
if the mobilised resources are equitably distributed, then this policy can be
easily transformed into a progressive one. Our proposed policy immensely
benefits the poorer sections of the population in India who have been deprived of any access to clean forms of energy, and even a basic facility like
electricity, for ages. This policy by providing free electricity and access to
public transport till a certain level brings a significant improvement in the
lifestyle of the common people, especially the poor.
As we have argued earlier, developing countries, like India, need to address the issue of climate change with similar urgency as being done in the
advanced economies. It is not something out of altruism that India, or
for that matter any other developing country, needs to do; it is primarily
because of protecting their economic interests. Agriculture is one of the primary occupations in this region of the world and as climate and agricultural
scientists have predicted that this sector is most vulnerable to erratic climate conditions(Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
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[2016]). So, arguing for the protection of the environment is, in a sense,
similar to defending the interests of the farmers and peasants, and thereby
the food security, of these developing countries. India, which is already on
a high growth trajectory since the 1990s and facing a continuously rising
demand for energy, needs to simultaneously address the ecological concerns
as well as the high rates of unemployment so that the future growth trajectory can be made inclusive for the majority of the population. And, our
proposed policy is a step forward towards addressing these concerns.
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Appendix
Table 8: Code Matching from Input Output Tables to NSS Categories
Consumption Categories
Food
Clothing and Footwear
Manufactured Goods

Housing
Fuel and Electricity
Transport
Health and Education
Misc Services

IO Codes*

NSS Codes**

C01T05+C15T16
C17t19
C20+C21T22+C24+C25+
+C26+C27+C28+C29+
+C30T33X+C31+C34+C35+C36T37
C45+C70+C71
C10T14+C23+C40T41
C60T63
C80+C85
C50T52+C55+C64+C65T67
+C72+C73T74+C75+C90T93

1 to 17
29+30+31
21+22+23+34

26
18
25
19+32+33
20+24+27

*Codes are taken from OECD Input-Output Tables (IOT), 2015
**Codes are serial numbers of items in the Summary of Consumer Expenditure
(Level 12) of Schedule 1.0 (NSS 68th round)
Source: Compiled by authors from IO, NSS
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